¡Quememos las urnas por una elección justa! Violencia electoral y regalías mineras en las elecciones municipales peruanas

Abstract

This study analyzes the effect the transfer of mining royalties would have on the probability of electoral violence. The assumption guiding this research is that, in municipalities that are particularly rich in natural resources, there is an exacerbated interest to reach the municipal government seat. Thus, in a context characterized by a high level of political competitiveness, campaign tactics or strategies would be assessed in a strict or rigorous way by various candidates and their followers. Therefore, the use of violence with the purpose of annulling an election and calling for a new election (EMC) could be interpreted as a last resource of political actors who like to use disloyal (illegal or illegitimate) political practices during the electoral process. Undoubtedly, this phenomenon (electoral violence) would mainly arise in electoral districts with bountiful natural resources where they are interested in keeping certain subnational authoritarian “enclaves” based on patronage practices.