



Party leaders' selection and internal political party conflicts at the subnational level in Mexico

CARLOS GUADARRAMA-CRUZ
<876216@pcpuma.acatlan.unam.mx>
Facultad de Estudios Superiores Acatlán
Universidad Autónoma de México
Naucalpan de Juárez, México
ORCID: 0000-0001-7692-2894

[Abstract] This article analyzes the origin of intraparty conflicts in the state party presidencies selection processes within the PAN, PRI, PRD, and Morena in Mexico during the period 2010-2022. The study analyzes 438 selection processes using mixed-effects logistic regression tests to assess the hypothesis that electoral incongruence elevates the risk of conflict, a relationship that is moderated by high levels of local partisan institutionalization. The results show that when parties have solid organizational structures at the state level, conflicts tend to decrease, even if there is incongruence between the national and local electoral results. The study offers a theoretical and empirical contribution to the analysis of intraparty politics at subnational levels. In this way, the work proposes new lines of research on the topic of politics and conflicts within political parties.

[Keywords] Intraparty conflicts, subnational politics, party institutionalization, electoral incongruence, political parties, Mexico.

[Título] Selección de dirigencias y conflictos dentro de los partidos políticos a nivel subnacional en México

[Resumen] Este artículo estudia el origen de los conflictos intrapartidarios en los procesos de selección de presidencias estatales del PAN, PRI, PRD y Morena en México durante el periodo 2010-2022. El trabajo analiza 438 procesos de selección con pruebas de regresión logística con efectos mixtos para probar la hipótesis de que la incongruencia electoral aumenta las probabilidades de conflicto, aunque este efecto disminuye cuando existen altos niveles de institucionalización partidista local. Los resultados evidencian que, cuando los partidos cuentan con estructuras organizativas sólidas a nivel estatal, los conflictos tienden a reducirse, incluso en presencia de incongruencia entre los resultados electorales nacional y local. El estudio constituye una contribución teórica y empírica al análisis de la política intrapartidaria en niveles subnacionales. De esta manera, el artículo plantea nuevas líneas de investigación sobre la política y los conflictos dentro de los partidos políticos.

[Palabras clave] Conflictos intrapartidarios, política subnacional, institucionalización partidista, incongruencia electoral, partidos políticos, México.

[Received] 04/06/2025 and [Accepted] 05/12/2025

GUADARRAMA-CRUZ, Carlos. 2025. "Party leaders' selection and internal political party conflicts at the subnational level in Mexico". *Elecciones* (July-December), 24(30): e3004.

DOI: 10.53557/Elecciones.2025.v24n30.04.en

1. INTRODUCTION¹

Conflicts constitute an inherent dimension of the internal dynamics of political parties. As in other organizational spheres, intra-party conflicts emerge when actors fail to reach agreements over the distribution of contested resources, that is goods to which they attribute particular value, given that their control is essential for the satisfaction of their interests (MELUCCI 1999). The capacity to control resources such as leadership positions, for instance, facilitates access to other assets, including electoral candidacies and financial resources. These represent critical zones of uncertainty for the fulfillment of the specific objectives pursued by internal groups or agents (PANEBIANCO 1995).

The scholarly literature has extensively debated the conditions that foster the emergence of conflicts within party organizations. A significant body of research suggests that such conflicts arise either from the non-compliance with internal rules governing the selection of candidates or leaders, or from the inherently undemocratic nature of those rules (CROSS & KATZ 2013; HAZAN & RAHAT 2010; FREIDENBERG & LEVITSKY 2007; LLANOS & ROZA 2018; FREIDENBERG 2005; 2016; CORDERO & COLLIER 2018A; 2018B; CORONA ARMENTA 2013). Other scholars contend that intra-party politics becomes particularly conflictual following electoral defeats (KATZ & MAIR 1995; ALCÁNTARA & FREIDENBERG 2003; ESPEJEL ESPINOZA & DÍAZ SANDOVAL 2016). This situation is also frequently attributed to ideological heterogeneity regarding policy positions (CERON 2012; 2015; CLOSE & GHERGHINA 2019).

Further analytical approaches have identified additional explanatory factors. Some studies have observed that parties with left-wing ideologies tend to be more prone to internal strife (CHIRU *ET AL.* 2015). Another prominent line of inquiry prioritizes the analysis of organizational dysfunctions as a fundamental cause of such conflicts (PANEBIANCO 1995; ASTUDILLO & DETTERBECK 2020; LOXBO 2013; BOLLEYER *ET AL.* 2017; BOLLEYER *ET AL.* 2019). Finally,

¹ This work was produced during a postdoctoral research stay at the Facultad de Estudios Superiores Acatlán, Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México (UNAM), supported by a fellowship from the DGAPA-UNAM. The study presents findings from the doctoral dissertation “Intra-Party Conflict at the Subnational Level in Mexico (2010–2022).” The author acknowledges and appreciates the comments and suggestions made on previous drafts and versions, as well as the contributions of all those who made this publication possible, with special thanks to Flavia Freidenberg.

a growing body of work examines the influence of cultural elements on the likelihood of conflicts arising within political parties (ALEYOMI 2013; OKONKWO & UNAJI 2016; YADAV & FIDALGO 2021).

While the literature has offered a wide range of explanations for the emergence of conflicts at the national level of party organizations, this study begins from the following research question: what explains the emergence of conflicts at the subnational levels of parties? On this basis, the objective is to analyze the low incidence of conflicts within the subnational structures of four Mexican political parties—the Partido Acción Nacional (PAN), the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI), the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRD), and the Movimiento de Regeneración Nacional (Morena)—during the period 2010–2022. The central argument posits that multilevel electoral competition and party institutionalization constitute conditions that shape the emergence of conflicts arising from state-level leadership renewal processes. This is encapsulated in the hypothesis that electoral incongruence increases the probability of conflict, although this effect diminishes under conditions of high local party institutionalization.

The analytical proposal is to examine situations in which dissident groups resort to electoral courts as a consequence of the failure of intra-party justice bodies to adequately process conflicts stemming from leadership renewals in these four Mexican parties. The study employs a mixed-effects logistic regression model to analyze 438 state presidency selection processes conducted within these organizations between 2010 and 2022. The results indicate that the interaction between electoral incongruence and high levels of local institutionalization reduces the likelihood of intra-party conflicts emerging at the subnational level.

The findings derived from the analysis of Mexican parties seek to contribute innovatively to theoretical and conceptual debates on intra-party politics, both in terms of the conceptual development of intra-party conflict and in formulating an explanation for the emergence of such conflicts at subnational levels in Latin America. Furthermore, the study invites the initiation of a new discussion on measures aimed at strengthening the democratic functioning of intra-party life, with the objective of enhancing trust in political parties and improving internal coexistence.

This study is organized into five sections. The first presents the theoretical framework, defining intra-party conflict and developing the argument related to its origins in the subnational sphere of parties. The second describes the conflicts that manifest during state leadership selection processes in the PAN, PRI, PRD, and Morena. The third presents the methodological strategy employed to address the issue of conflicts within Mexican parties. The fourth presents the findings of the quantitative analysis. Finally, the fifth section offers a synthesis of the study and raises some reflections based on the analysis conducted.

2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK ON THE EMERGENCE OF INTRA-PARTY CONFLICTS AT THE SUBNATIONAL LEVEL

2.1. WHAT IS AN INTRA-PARTY CONFLICT?

Political parties do not constitute unitary actors, as within them exist groups with distinct interests (CERON 2012; 2019; BOUCEK 2009; SARTORI 2005). Although there is a consensus in conceiving them as “associations of individuals that serve as a vehicle for those whose goal is to obtain public office through competitive elections” (FREIDENBERG 2017, 835), the internal life of parties is characterized by debate surrounding electoral campaign strategies, the individuals who should run for public office, and the exercise of power in the event of electoral victories.

Intra-party conflicts can be understood as disputes over the control of power resources—resources to which different factions assign high value for the achievement of their objectives. In the face of these disputes, some actors opt for contentious political strategies such as demonstrations, marches, or various forms of sabotage. Other actors choose the path of litigation, resolved when a jurisdictional authority issues a ruling favorable to one of the opposing sides. Although both constitute expressions of intra-party conflict, this study focuses on the latter, as it allows for more precise access to documented information regarding these struggles, particularly in the context of leadership renewal processes and the judicialization of intra-party politics (TRUJILLO 2013; MARTÍN REYES 2012a, 2012b).

The intensity of a conflict depends on how internal groups conduct the dispute over power resources. Some conflicts are more acute than others

depending on the degree of differences and divisions between groups, which can generate either manifest or latent tensions. Certain struggles become public and provoke actions such as member resignations, protest voting, or an unfavorable image of the party. Other controversies remain within the internal sphere and are addressed within the organization, thereby preventing their repercussions from spilling over into the public domain. This distinction helps elucidate why, for some groups, the dispute over candidacies or leadership positions is crucial for maintaining relevance within the party structure (LEIRAS 2007).

2.2. CONFLICTS IN SUBNATIONAL PARTY STRUCTURES

The most recent scholarship on intra-party dynamics argues that factions or internal groups compete for control of power within these organizations (LEHRER & LIN 2020; GREENE & HABER 2016; KITSCHOLT 1989; HARMEL & JANDA 1994). This involves disputes over leadership positions, organizational resources, and the so-called zones of uncertainty (PANEBIANCO 1995). This perspective gives rise to several analytical questions: at what point does competition transform into conflict over the access to and control of resources? To what extent do internal groups possess the capacities and strategies to appropriate such resources through unconventional, informal, or even illicit means? What are the triggers of conflict? And, more specifically, how do these disputes originate in subnational spaces?

The confrontation of proposals regarding issues relevant to the party organization impels actors to seek affinities with others within parties, thereby favoring the formation of internal groups (BELLONI & BELLER 1978; ROSE 1964; ZINCONE 1972). These factions compete for available resources, particularly when experiencing conditions of deprivation and exclusion (BOUCEK 2012), which intensifies contentious interaction and heightens tensions among them (PAZ PÉREZ 2006, 10; GHERGHINA *ET AL.* 2019).

Differences may also arise from the manner in which decision-making processes unfold. The selection of candidates, for example, constitutes an especially conflict-prone scenario, as it represents a critical juncture in internal life where institutional and electoral incentives converge, alongside the pressures exerted by diverse actors within the organization (MARTÍNEZ VALDÉS 2010, 12).

Following this logic, control of party leadership becomes fundamental, as it conditions access to the distribution of candidacies. While intra-party groups would be interested in obtaining candidacies for all positions across all districts and levels of competition, they sometimes concentrate their efforts on a single office during local or concurrent elections (DOŠEK & FREIDENBERG 2013). This dynamic is not novel; all groups seek to access these spaces to satisfy their interests, exercise greater control over power resources, and thereby enhance their chances of influencing the party structure. This argument applies equally to the subnational instances of parties, where groups also endeavor to obtain spaces and resources from the organizational structure.²

At subnational levels, a distinction can be drawn between groups that occupy leadership positions and those that remain excluded from them. The former groups prioritize preserving control over these instances to ensure their influence in the allocation of candidacies. This position affords them the opportunity to manipulate the rules governing internal processes and to leverage external power resources—such as the public offices they hold, their access to media, or public funding—in their favor (FREIDENBERG 2017, 837).

For their part, groups excluded from the dominant coalition focus on alternative power resources that facilitate access to local candidacies without depending on negotiations with the leadership; among these resources are clientelistic networks and territorial presence (FREIDENBERG 2017, 837). Nevertheless, these groups find themselves at a disadvantage, as they lack sufficient elements to secure favorable positions within the party structure.

This scenario proves favorable for groups outside the leadership, who generate conflicts as a strategy to access it, while incumbent leaders seek to contain such challenges. The latter first attempt to impose solutions that preserve their interests and subsequently endeavor to integrate dissident leaderships into the organizational structure (DOŠEK & FREIDENBERG 2013; FLORIANO RIBEIRO 2013). Likewise, the lack of effectiveness of intra-party justice mechanisms leads conflicting groups to resort to litigious political

2 This implies that party organizations conduct their activities in multilevel contexts, such as federal states. This has fostered the development of a body of literature on subnational politics (FREIDENBERG & SUÁREZ-CAO 2014; FALLETI 2010; MONTERO & SAMUELS 2004), as well as on the multilevel organization of party systems and political parties themselves (ESCOLAR 2011; DOŠEK & FREIDENBERG 2013; GIBSON & SUÁREZ-CAO 2010; LEIRAS 2010; THORLAKSON 2007; 2009).

strategies to address their demands (BOLLEYER *ET AL.* 2019; MARTÍN REYES 2012a; 2012b).

In selective processes, conflicts express dissatisfaction regarding how statutory rules are interpreted and implemented, particularly when such rules limit the participation of members and attempt to manipulate results in favor of the incumbent leadership. Consequently, the judicialization of intra-party politics becomes an instrument through which dissident groups file appeals before electoral justice bodies, contesting some stage or outcome of the election of subnational leaderships.

From this perspective, conflicts emerge when one or multiple stages of the selection process are challenged, including the definition of the selection mechanism, candidacy requirements, or internal campaign activities. They are also related to complaints of malpractice during election days, such as vote-buying or the transportation of voters to polling sites. Similarly, conflicts arise regarding election results when there are indications of illegality.

Furthermore, challenging groups take into account electoral results in both national and subnational elections. When electoral incongruence exists between these two levels,³ dissident groups concentrate their efforts on obtaining power resources at the local level, given that when levels of electoral congruence are high, the national leadership is more likely to assume control over electoral strategies across all levels of competition.

Conversely, challenging groups have limited possibilities of generating conflicts when local party structures exhibit high levels of institutionalization,⁴ as the existence of formalized rules and a robust organizational structure at the local level provides better guarantees of participation and channels for

3 Congruence between subnational and national electoral outcomes is observed when parties compete at both levels and obtain very similar vote shares (SCHAKEL 2013, 633). Explanations for dissimilarity or incongruence in electoral results typically emphasize that subnational elections are subordinated to higher-level contests, which in turn shapes partisan support (SCHAKEL 2013, 634–35). One way to examine this phenomenon is by analyzing the levels of nationalization and regionalization of political parties using Bochsler's (2010) standardized index.

4 Institutionalization refers to the process through which political parties develop stable and enduring structures, rules, and practices that enable them to operate effectively over time. This process encompasses internal decision-making procedures, candidate selection mechanisms, and conflict management, as well as the construction of linkages with other political actors and institutions (RANDALL & SVÄSAND 2002). In this sense, institutionalization is understood as "the process through which the party consolidates itself in terms of patterns of behavior and attitudes or political culture" (DUQUE DAZA 2005, 115).

processing disputes. However, even in contexts where local groups maintain linkages with national ones, low levels of institutionalization increase the probability of conflict emergence.

Based on the foregoing, the following research hypothesis is formulated:

H1. The positive effect of electoral incongruence on the probability of intra-party conflict emergence diminishes as the institutionalization of the party organization at the subnational level increases.

3. LEADERSHIP SELECTION AND INTRA-PARTY CONFLICTS IN THE PAN, PRI, PRD, AND MORENA AT THE SUBNATIONAL LEVEL (2010–2022)

In Mexico, the legal framework establishes obligations for political parties regarding the incorporation of democratic principles in their internal life (CÁRDENAS GRACIA 1992). Although all parties operate under the same legal provisions regulating their selective processes for candidacies and leadership, as well as the participation of their members, each organization has adopted rules and methods that generate friction among their internal groups.

In the case of the PAN, prior to 2013, its state presidencies were elected through the State Political Council, a governing body composed of members of the State Executive Committee, individuals holding governmental or state representative offices, as well as other members appointed by the State Assemblies. Precisely in that year, following the 2012 electoral defeat—which closed its cycle as the governing party that had begun with the 2000 presidential elections—the party reformed its statutes to incorporate primary elections as a selective method at this level. However, in 2015, it established a rule allowing the State Political Council to directly appoint the state presidency when only one aspirant registered, thereby reducing internal competition.

The PRI statutes contemplate various mechanisms for selecting national, state, and municipal leaderships. Following the 2000 presidential defeat and subsequent internal adjustments among its groups, the party rarely resorted to the internal election method, particularly due to the experience of the 2002 national leadership renewal. The recurring practice of “unity candidacies” as an informal mechanism in leadership renewal inhibits the participation

of its members in competitive processes. This dynamic is reinforced by the rules established in recent years to renew state presidencies, which increase the powers of the State Political Councils. Likewise, the statutes provide for a preference rank as a figure to fill vacancies in the state presidency, following a strict hierarchy among the positions of the *Comité Directivo Estatal*.

In the PRD, the evolution of rules for renewing state leaderships is closely linked to its political trajectory.⁵ Although historically it has been a party that promoted the participation of its members in decision-making, constant post-electoral disputes led to limiting the use of internal elections. A 2009 statutory reform granted State Political Councils the authority to define the method for selecting state leaderships and empowered the National Executive Committee (*Comité Ejecutivo Nacional* – CEN) to appoint delegates in entities where the party obtained less than 5 percent of votes in local elections. Among the most recent modifications, stand out the inclusion of polls as mechanisms for selecting leaderships and candidacies, a measure adopted in 2015.

Morena, a left-wing party that obtained legal registration in 2014 under the leadership of Andrés Manuel López Obrador following his departure from the PRD, won the presidency in 2018 and 2024, and currently governs twenty-three federal entities.⁶ Although it seeks to consolidate its territorial presence, it faces difficulties in states where traditional parties maintain deeper roots, such as Nuevo León or Guanajuato. The party integrates a diversity of intra-party groups—a legacy of its PRD origins—but it also reproduces practices of party discipline characteristic of twentieth-century PRI politics. Regarding the selection of state presidencies, Morena does not contemplate internal election as a method of designation, as this attribution falls to the State Political Council, composed of political leaders of the party and members chosen at random, who in principle should not respond to factional interests.

Non-compliance with rules or stages of the party leadership selection process constitutes one of the main sources of intra-party conflicts, which are typically channeled through appeals before local electoral courts. Between 2010 and 2022, the PAN was the party with the highest proportion of processes


5 Following the 2024 federal elections, the PRD lost its national legal registration; however, it continues to maintain organizational structures in some federal entities, such as the State of Mexico.

6 The data are updated with the electoral results of the 2024 federal and state elections. The figure includes governorships won in coalition with allied parties.

involving conflicts: 25.42% of its state renewals were conflictive. Far behind were the PRD (9.21%), Morena (7.95%), and the PRI (7.69%) (see Figure 1). Focusing on the PAN, one of the most intense episodes occurred between 2012 and 2013 in the State of Mexico, the country's most populous entity, historically governed by the PRI since the end of the Mexican Revolution and where the PAN had managed to consolidate itself as the second political force due to its municipal-level results.

FIGURE 1

Selection of state leaderships with or without conflict in PAN, PRI, PRD, and Morena (2010-2022)




Source: Own elaboration
Note: $\chi^2(3) = 23.2445$, $Pr = 0.000$

In the case of the PRI, state-level conflicts are relatively scarce; however, when they arise, they often become significant challenges for the national leadership. In various federal entities, the appointment of delegates by the CEN has generated internal tensions and expressions of dissatisfaction. These episodes challenge traditional party discipline and call into question the informal agreements that for decades contributed to the cohesion of its internal life.

Regarding the state level of the PRD, the number of conflicts is also low, a striking finding given its original model characterized by struggles between internal groups. Nevertheless, several conflictive episodes were recorded in states such as the State of Mexico, Hidalgo, Oaxaca, Puebla, Querétaro, and Sonora.

In Morena, the trajectory of subnational conflicts is shorter and consistent with its recent creation. A portion of these occurred during the 2015 internal elections, when the party was still in opposition and the intervention of the National Honor and Justice Commission (Comisión Nacional de Honor y Justicia) had relevant effects on local intra-party politics. Subsequently, the renewal of state leaderships in 2022 proved less conflictive for the party: appeals were minimal, and conflicts were only documented in Baja California, Guanajuato, Hidalgo, Morelos, and Oaxaca.

FIGURE 2
Frequency of conflicts by party and federal entity (2010–2022)



Source: Own elaboration

Finally, a distinctive feature of these conflicts is their unequal territorial distribution (see Figure 2). Based on the number of litigations recorded between 2010 and 2022, federal entities can be classified into four groups. The first brings together states without intra-party conflicts: Chihuahua, Durango, Nayarit, Quintana Roo, Tlaxcala, and Zacatecas. The second group is the most numerous and consists of fifteen entities with a single conflict: Aguascalientes, Baja California, Baja California Sur, Campeche, Coahuila, Colima, Guerrero, Jalisco, Puebla, San Luis Potosí, Sinaloa, Sonora, Tabasco, Tamaulipas, and Yucatán.

The third set comprises states where two parties recorded at least one conflict: Chiapas, Mexico City, the State of Mexico, Michoacán, and Nuevo León. Finally, the fourth group corresponds to entities where three of the four parties faced intra-party struggles: Guanajuato, Hidalgo, Morelos, Oaxaca, Querétaro, and Veracruz. In summary, the distribution of this type of dispute shows that internal struggles are not exclusive to any particular region of the country or to a specific party; rather, they constitute a widespread phenomenon among Mexican political parties.

4. METHODOLOGICAL STRATEGY

The data presented suggest that certain conditions influence the territorial distribution of conflicts. From this observation arises a central question: what are the factors that explain why disputes emerge within parties? The Mexican case constitutes a suitable scenario for investigating this issue, as it provides the necessary elements to examine the extent to which factors such as electoral incongruence and the institutionalization of parties at the subnational level condition the emergence of conflicts in that arena.

The dependent variable is dichotomous and is used to distinguish between the presence or absence of conflict in each state leadership renewal process, disaggregated by party and federal entity for the period 2010–2022. Its operational definition considers as a conflict the appeal presented by some group within the party related to one or several stages of the selection process: from the decision regarding the election mechanism and the establishment of participation requirements, to the development of internal campaign activities. Within the Mexican appeals system, the instrument through which

these disputes are judicialized is the Trial for the Protection of the Political-Electoral Rights of Citizens (Juicio para la Protección de los Derechos Político-Electorales de la Ciudadanía – JDC)—a legal recourse through which an individual argues that their political-electoral rights were violated during the intra-party contest. This trial constitutes the mechanism through which conflicts cease to be a mere private matter of the parties and enter the sphere of jurisdictional authorities.

The construction of the dependent variable relied on local and national newspaper sources, complemented by a review of rulings from the Electoral Court of the Federal Judiciary (Tribunal Electoral del Poder Judicial de la Federación – TEPJF). In the first stage, the main events of intra-party life in each state were identified through the systematic review of news portals and regional newspapers. This strategy proved useful in contexts where documentary sources on the organizational development of parties at the local level are deficient. Subsequently, appeals associated with those episodes were verified on the electronic site “Consulta de sentencias del TEPJF”⁷ to review the rulings issued by the Regional Chambers and the Superior Chamber. It should be noted that during the review, resolutions related to agreements, clarification incidents, non-compliance, and administrative procedures were excluded.

The independent variables—electoral incongruence and party institutionalization—are continuous. The first is operationalized using Johnston’s (1980) dissimilarity index (DIS), which compares the levels of national and subnational electoral support obtained by each party. This indicator takes values ranging from 0 to 100: values close to zero express maximum congruence between both levels, while values close to 100 reflect wide incongruence or vote dissimilarity (DOŠEK & FREIDENBERG 2013, 167). The formula of the index is as follows:

$$DIS = \frac{1}{2} |X_{iN} - X_{iR}|$$

Source: Ascarrunz (2015, 41)

7 Available at: <https://www.te.gob.mx/buscador/>

Where X_{-iN} corresponds to the percentage of votes of a party in national elections and X_{-iR} to the result of the same party in subnational elections. The data used to calculate this index come from the aggregated voting percentages that each party achieved in the 2006, 2012, and 2018 presidential elections, contrasted with the results of gubernatorial elections in each state. The theoretical expectation associated with this variable posits that greater electoral incongruence increases the probability of intra-party conflicts arising.

Given that some selection processes did not coincide with electoral years, it was necessary to determine how to integrate these data. Therefore, it was decided to assign the same index values to processes held in an election year as well as to those held in subsequent years, up to the next gubernatorial election. The information sources consulted were the electronic portals of the National Electoral Institute (Instituto Nacional Electoral – INE), the Public Electoral Bodies (Organismos Públicos Electorales), and the Center for Studies on Democracy and Elections (CEDE) of the Universidad Autónoma Metropolitana, Iztapalapa.

The variable of party institutionalization recognizes that this process is linked to the degree of organizational consolidation of parties. It is expressed in two internal properties: routinization and infusion of values. The first refers to the weight acquired by formal rules in intra-party processes over time; the second alludes to the attitudinal dimension that describes the bond of members with the party (BOLLEYER & RUTH 2018; PANEBIANCO 1995). Accordingly, it is anticipated that higher levels of local institutionalization decrease the probability of a conflict emerging.

The values of this variable are taken from the V-Party Dataset (LINDBERG *ET AL.* 2022). In particular, this study used the measure of local organizational strength of parties (local organizational strength [v2paactcom]), based on the question: “To what degree are party activists and personnel permanently active in local communities?” This variable is expressed on a continuous scale from 0 to 4, where values close to zero indicate a negligible permanent presence of activists and party staff, reflecting low institutionalization.⁸ In contrast, values

8 For the institutionalization variable, the continuous-scale transformation provided by the V-Party Dataset is used. The original survey item is measured on a five-point ordinal scale: 0: There is negligible permanent presence of party activists and personnel in local communities; 1: There is minor permanent presence of party activists and personnel in local communities; 2: There is noticeable permanent presence of party activists and personnel in local communities; 3: There is significant permanent presence of party activists and personnel in local communities; and 4: There is widespread permanent presence of party activists and personnel in local communities.

close to four suggest a widespread permanent presence of activists and party staff at the local level and, therefore, higher institutionalization. Data reported between 2009 and 2018 are used.

The control variables incorporate elements related to internal democracy and political-ideological factors. The first set includes indicators that evaluate the inclusion of the selectorate in each renewal process, which allows understanding the level of participation of members in internal decision-making within parties (FREIDENBERG 2003, 15; KENIG 2009A; 2009B; KENIG *ET AL.* 2015). The expectation is that more inclusive methods increase the probability of conflicts, as competition between two or more aspirants can generate greater tensions during the development of the process, making its organization more complex. This variable is coded from 1 to 10, where values close to 1 indicate high exclusion and values close to 10, high inclusion.

TABLE 1

Inclusion and selectorates in political parties

Less inclusion	1	Party Statutes
	2	National Executive Committee
	3	National Political Council
	4	<i>Ad hoc</i> commissions
	5	National Electoral Commission
More inclusion	6	State Electoral Commission
	7	State Executive Committee
	8	State Political Council
	9	State Assembly
	10	Membership election

Source: Own elaboration based on Kenig (2009a; 2009b) and Kenig *et al.* (2015)

The second variable on intra-party democracy refers to inclusion in statutory rules (VON DEM BERGE *ET AL.* 2013; GUADARRAMA CRUZ 2019). The absence of democratic provisions in selection norms increases the probability of internal conflicts appearing, as form inside the groups oppose such rules

and seek to modify them. This is a continuous variable, whose values can be both positive and negative, depending on the degree of openness embedded in the rules.

The second group of control variables incorporates indicators from the V-Party Dataset (LINDBERG *ET AL.* 2022), associated with dimensions of identity and ideology of parties in Mexico. The variables considered are: religious principles, perception of the role of women, and ideology. For the first, the expectation that parties with greater linkage to religious principles face lower probabilities of conflict is controlled for, as a broad internal consensus tends to prevail regarding those values. Regarding the perception of gender equality, it is anticipated that greater support for the equal participation of women tends to reduce intra-party conflict. Finally, concerning the ideology variable, the assumption is that parties more committed to pluralism have a lower probability of conflict, as they favor the participation of members and respect for their rights.⁹

The selection of the PAN, PRI, PRD, and Morena as observation units is justified because they are the party organizations with the greatest presence across the thirty-two federal entities and have maintained constant representation in state congresses. Information on conflicts was systematized in an original and unpublished database entitled “Conflictos en los procesos de selección de presidencias estatales en los partidos políticos de México.” This dataset adopts an unbalanced panel design containing 128 units (party/entity) and 438 state presidency selection processes, in which the presence or absence of conflict is identified.

It is necessary to acknowledge some limitations of the methodological strategy, fundamentally associated with the availability of information on intra-party life. Several of the variables included in the model have been constructed as proxies that should be refined in subsequent studies. This limitation is compounded by the absence of information on the internal

9 Indicators from the V-Party Dataset are incorporated to approximate ideological dimensions of Mexican political parties. First, the religious principles variable measures the extent to which parties invoke God, religion, or sacred/religious texts to justify their programmatic positions. Second, the variable related to perceptions of women's participation in the labor market assesses the level of party support for substantive gender equality in this domain, considering legal aspects of equal treatment and pay, parental leave, and financial support for childcare. Finally, the anti-pluralism index is employed as an indicator of ideology (LINDBERG *ET AL.* 2022).

dynamics of parties in six entities: Chihuahua, Durango, Nayarit, Quintana Roo, Tlaxcala, and Zacatecas. Likewise, although the database records 117 observation units with at least two selective processes, in eleven cases it was only possible to locate one process documented through the local press or party sources.¹⁰

The effect of electoral competition conditions and organizational institutionalization on the emergence of intra-party conflicts is evaluated through a quantitative research design, using a mixed-effects logistic regression—that is, with fixed and random effects—implemented via *meologit* in Stata 14. This technique is suitable due to the panel structure of the data, grouped by party and by federal entity. The models are presented with robust standard errors, using the *vce (robust)* option.

5. RESULTS

Two mixed-effects logistic regression models were estimated, whose results are presented in Table 2. The first model evaluates the direct effect of electoral incongruence, subnational organizational institutionalization, and the interaction between both variables on the probability of intra-party conflicts arising. The second model incorporates these same variables, as well as the proposed controls. In both cases, the central hypothesis of the research is tested: as organizational institutionalization increases in the subnational sphere, the positive effect of electoral incongruence on the probability of conflict appearance diminishes.

10 Most of these cases correspond to the PRD and are located in Baja California Sur, Durango, Guanajuato, Michoacán, Morelos, Nuevo León, Sinaloa, and Tabasco. One case corresponds to the PRI in Nayarit, and two correspond to Morena in Nayarit and San Luis Potosí.

TABLE 2

Electoral incongruence, institutionalization, and intra-party conflict
at the local level in Mexico

	Model 1	Model 2
Electoral incongruence	0.270* (0.111)	0.235 (0.138)
Institutionalization	1.150** (0.442)	-1.121 (2.338)
Electoral incongruence * institutionalization	-0.128** (0.040)	-0.116* (0.047)
Selectorate	-	0.249** (0.083)
Internal democracy	-	0.440 (1.323)
Religious principles	-	1.601 (2.297)
Perception about women	-	-.3.504 (3.420)
Ideology	-	-0.660 (1.403)
Constant	-4.613*** (1.285)	5.400 (10.010)
Wald chi2	22.24	48.58
Prob > chi2	0.0001	0.0000
Null Deviance	333.9593	333.9593
Residual Deviance	308.538	270.0175
Log pseudolikelihood	-156.37341	-142.39707
AIC	322.74681	304.79414
BIC	343.15791	345.61633
Pseudo R ² Tjur	0.05512562	0.1556569
N	438	438
N groups	32	32

Source: Own elaboration
Note: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001. The models already include robust standard errors.


The most relevant finding lies in the interaction between electoral incongruence and institutionalization; the latter moderates the effect of the former on the probability of intra-party disputes emerging. This result is consistent with theoretical expectations regarding the implications of institutionalization for strengthening organizational autonomy vis-à-vis the electoral environment (PANEBIANCO 1995).

Indeed, the results show that, in parties with high levels of electoral incongruence, the incentives to initiate conflicts during the selection of state presidencies diminish as institutionalization increases. This pattern may manifest in federal entities where parties maintain permanent and functioning structures, which allows for the anticipation that selection processes will discourage conflictive behavior.

Conversely, when both electoral incongruence and institutionalization are low, the probability of conflict increases (see Figure 3). Under these conditions, the absence of incentives to respect selection rules may be associated with the persistent influence of national instances in the internal life of parties within federal entities, which impedes the consolidation of organizational structures in those contexts.

GRÁFICO 3

Predicted effects of electoral incongruence and institutionalization on the emergence of intra-party conflicts at the subnational level in Mexico



Source: Own elaboration

Note: Only the values for the highest and lowest categories of the institutionalization variable are presented.

Regarding the control variables, the coefficient corresponding to inclusion in selectorates is statistically significant and consistent with the expectation that more inclusive selection methods increase the probability of intra-party conflicts emerging. Furthermore, Wald tests suggest that the performance of both models is statistically significant and that the estimation contributes to explaining relevant variations in the appearance of conflicts within Mexican parties at the subnational level. In summary, the results of the mixed-effects logistic model support the main hypothesis: the interaction between party institutionalization and electoral incongruence exerts a moderating effect that decreases the probability of conflicts being generated.

6. CONCLUSIONS

The purpose of this study was to analyze the reduced number of intra-party conflicts in the subnational structures of the PAN, PRI, PRD, and Morena between 2010 and 2022. This was achieved through an argument that explains the emergence of conflicts at the subnational organizational levels of political organizations, as well as the estimation of the effect of the interaction between electoral incongruence and institutionalization on the probability of disputes arising during state leadership selection processes. The aim was to contribute to the development of the literature on intra-party politics and conflict, as well as to the organizational study of parties in spheres different from the national one, as both areas remain underexplored.

The empirical results demonstrate that organizational institutionalization attenuates the impact of electoral incongruence; as local structures become more consolidated, the effect of unequal electoral competition on the emergence of conflicts diminishes. The findings can be understood as scenarios that frame the emergence of conflicts at the subnational level. The research offers useful elements for political practice, as one recommendation is to strengthen the local institutionalization of parties, which can be translated into reforms to party legislation and statutes to establish clear rules regarding selection mechanisms and dispute resolution.

Furthermore, this work opens a promising line of research in the study of intra-party politics. In this sense, it is pertinent to expand the evidence through longitudinal studies with a greater number of observations. Research with qualitative or mixed approaches should also be promoted to understand decision-making processes, faction dynamics, and agreements between leaderships at different levels. Likewise, future research should delve into the role of women in leadership selection processes, as well as the relationships between national and local intra-party actors and the trajectories of subnational leaderships. In summary, ample room remains for further progress in this research agenda.

REFERENCES

- Alcántara, Manuel, and Flavia Freidenberg, eds. 2003. *Partidos políticos de América Latina. Países andinos*. Fondo de Cultura Económica; Instituto Federal Electoral. <http://bit.ly/42CBQls>
- Aleyomi, Michael B. 2013. "Intra-Party Conflicts in Nigeria: The Case Study of Peoples Democratic Party (PDP)." *Journal of Sustainable Development in Africa* 15 (4): 281–96. <http://bit.ly/48XP0gG>
- Ascarrunz, Julio. 2015. "La relación nacional-departamental en Bolivia: una mirada multinivel al nuevo escenario político del país." *Politai* 6 (10): 39–59. <http://bit.ly/4pWrEy9>
- Astudillo, Javier, and Klaus Detterbeck. 2020. "Why, Sometimes, Primaries? Intraparty Democratization as a Default Selection Mechanism in German and Spanish Mainstream Parties." *Party Politics* 26 (5): 594–604. <https://doi.org/cw4j>
- Belloni, Frank P., and Dennis C. Beller, eds. 1978. *Faction Politics: Political Parties and Factionalism in Comparative Perspective*. Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-Clio Inc.
- Bochsler, Daniel. 2010. "Measuring Party Nationalisation: A New Gini-Based Indicator That Corrects for the Number of Units." *Electoral Studies* 29 (1): 155–68. <https://doi.org/dpqmh8>
- Bolleyer, Nicole, Felix-Christopher von Nostitz, and Nils-Christian Bormann. 2019. "Judicial Decision-Making Within Political Parties: A Political Approach." *Party Politics* 25 (5): 724–35. <https://doi.org/g6fj8q>
- Bolleyer, Nicole, Felix-Christopher von Nostitz, and Valeria Smirnova. 2017. "Conflict Regulation in Political Parties: An Account of Tribunal Decision-Making." *Party Politics* 23 (6): 834–47. <https://doi.org/gb229x>
- Bolleyer, Nicole, and Saskia P. Ruth. 2018. "Elite Investments in Party Institutionalization in New Democracies: A Two-Dimensional Approach." *The Journal of Politics* 80 (1): 288–302. <https://doi.org/gctx4s>
- Boucek, Françoise. 2009. "Rethinking Factionalism: Typologies, Intra-Party Dynamics and Three Faces of Factionalism." *Party Politics* 15 (4): 455–85. <https://doi.org/c7k794>
- Boucek, Françoise. 2012. *Factional Politics: How Dominant Parties Implode or Stabilize*. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Cárdenas Gracia, Jaime Fernando. 1989. "Crisis de legitimidad y democracia interna de los partidos políticos." Doctoral thesis, Madrid: Universidad Complutense de Madrid. <http://bit.ly/46D97PM>

- Ceron, Andrea. 2012. "Bounded Oligarchy: How and When Factions Constrain Leaders in Party Position-Taking." *Electoral Studies* 31 (4): 689–701. <https://doi.org/f4c636>
- Ceron, Andrea. 2015. "Brave Rebels Stay Home: Assessing the Effect of Intra-Party Ideological Heterogeneity and Party Whip on Roll-Call Votes." *Party Politics* 21 (2): 246–58. <https://doi.org/f64f46>
- Ceron, Andrea. 2019. *Leaders, Factions and the Game of Intra-Party Politics*. New York: Routledge.
- Chiru, Mihail, Anika Gauja, Sergiu Gherghina, and Juan Rodríguez-Teruel. 2015. "Explaining Change in Party Leadership Selection Rules." In *The Politics of Party Leadership: A Cross-National Perspective*, edited by William Cross and Jean-Benoit Pilet. Oxford: Oxford University Press. <https://doi.org/p8j3>
- Close, Caroline, and Sergiu Gherghina. 2019. "Rethinking Intra-Party Cohesion: Towards a Conceptual and Analytical Framework." *Party Politics* 25 (5): 652–63. <https://doi.org/gn4bkc>
- Cordero, Guillermo, and Xavier Coller, eds. 2018a. *Democratizing Candidate Selection: New Methods, Old Receipts?* Springer International Publishing. <https://doi.org/p8j8>
- Cordero, Guillermo, and Xavier Coller, eds. 2018b. "Lights and Shadows of Democratizing Candidate Selection." In *Democratizing Candidate Selection: New Methods, Old Receipts?*, edited by Guillermo Cordero and Xavier Coller. Cham: Springer International Publishing. <https://doi.org/p8j9>
- Corona Armenta, Gabriel. 2013. "Tendencias oligárquicas y democratizadoras del PRI, PAN y PRD durante las elecciones de sus dirigentes nacionales (México 1988-2012)." In *Democracia interna y tendencias oligárquicas de los partidos políticos en México: PAN, PRI y PRD*, 1st ed., edited by Francisco Casanova Álvarez and Gabriel Corona Armenta. Colección Ciencias políticas 95. Mexico City: Facultad de Estudios Superiores Acatlán; Gernika.
- Cross, William P., and Richard S. Katz, eds. 2013. *The Challenges of Intra-Party Democracy*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. <https://doi.org/p8j5>
- Došek, Tomáš, and Flavia Freidenberg. 2013. "La congruencia de los partidos y los sistemas de partidos multinivel en América Latina: conceptualización y evaluación de algunas herramientas de medición." *Politai* 4 (7): 161–78. <http://bit.ly/48j0Ulc>
- Duque Daza, Javier. 2005. "La institucionalización partidista. Una propuesta de abordaje de las estructuras organizativas partidistas." *Estudios Políticos* no. 27: 103–27. <https://doi.org/p8jw>

- Escolar, Marcelo. 2011. "Nacionalización, comunidad cívica y coordinación electoral. Problemas para la integración del sistema político en estados democráticos multinivel." *Revista SAAP. Publicación de Ciencia Política de la Sociedad Argentina de Análisis Político* 5 (2): 263–304. <http://bit.ly/4nDj7yt>
- Espejel Espinoza, Alberto, and Mariela Diaz Sandoval. 2016. "Esquema para el análisis de las caras externas de los partidos políticos." *Revista Análisis Público* no. 7: 43–67. <http://bit.ly/46RriQv>
- Falleti, Tulia G. 2010. *Decentralization and Subnational Politics in Latin America*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. <https://doi.org/gtkqmc>
- Floriano Ribeiro, Pedro. 2013. "Organização e poder nos partidos brasileiros: uma análise dos estatutos." *Revista Brasileira de Ciência Política* no. 102: 25–65. <https://doi.org/p8jz>
- Freidenberg, Flavia. 2005. "Mucho ruido y pocas nueces. Organizaciones partidistas y democracia interna en América Latina." *Polis* 1 (1): 91–134. <http://bit.ly/438FLXd>
- Freidenberg, Flavia. 2016. "La reina de las reformas. Las elecciones internas a las candidaturas presidenciales en América Latina." In *Reformas a las Organizaciones de Partidos en América Latina (1978–2015)*, 1st ed., edited by Flavia Freidenberg and Betilde Muñoz-Pogossian, 31–91. Lima: Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú; Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, Organización de Estados Americanos, and Sociedad Argentina de Análisis Político (SAAP).
- Freidenberg, Flavia. 2017. "Partidos políticos." In *Diccionario electoral*, 3rd ed., vol. II, 83–145. San José: Instituto Interamericano de Derechos Humanos; Tribunal Electoral del Poder Judicial de la Federación. <https://bit.ly/4mPzGpB>
- Freidenberg, Flavia, and Steven Levitsky. 2007. "Organización informal de los partidos en América Latina." *Desarrollo Económico* 46 (184): 539–68.
- Freidenberg, Flavia, and Julieta Suárez-Cao, eds. 2014. *Territorio y poder. Nuevos actores y competencia política en los sistemas de partidos multinivel en América Latina*. Salamanca: Ediciones Universidad Salamanca. <http://bit.ly/4mYTc3f>
- Gherghina, Sergiu, Caroline Close, and Petr Kopecký. 2019. "The Dynamics and Dimensions of Intra-Party Conflict: Introduction to the Special Issue." *Party Politics* 25 (5): 649–51. <https://doi.org/gn4bkb>
- Gibson, Edward L., and Julieta Suarez-Cao. 2010. "Federalized Party Systems and Subnational Party Competition: Theory and an Empirical Application to Argentina." *Comparative Politics* 43 (1): 21–39. <http://bit.ly/4q9xGM0>

- Greene, Zachary, and Matthias Haber. 2016. "Leadership Competition and Disagreement at Party National Congresses." *British Journal of Political Science* 46 (3): 611–32. <https://doi.org/f873w3>
- Guadarrama Cruz, Carlos. 2019. "¿Quién elige al líder? Selección de dirigencias estatales en los partidos políticos mexicanos de 2011 a 2017." Master's thesis, Mexico City: Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México. <http://bit.ly/4nxLXjP>
- Harmel, Robert, and Kenneth Janda. 1994. "An Integrated Theory of Party Goals and Party Change." *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 6 (3): 259–87. <https://doi.org/dd54vf>
- Hazan, Reuven Y., and Gideon Rahat. 2010. *Democracy within Parties: Candidate Selection Methods and Their Political Consequences*. Oxford University Press. <https://doi.org/bdkjhs>
- Johnston, Richard. 1980. "Federal and Provincial Voting: Contemporary Patterns and Historical Evolution." In *Small Worlds: Provinces and Parties in Canadian Political Life*, edited by David J. Elkins and Richard Simeon, 106–30. Toronto: Methuen Publications.
- Katz, Richard S., and Peter Mair. 1995. "Changing Models of Party Organization and Party Democracy: The Emergence of the Cartel Party." *Party Politics* 1 (1): 5–28. <https://doi.org/br2t2n>
- Kenig, Ofer. 2009a. "Classifying Party Leaders' Selection Methods in Parliamentary Democracies." *Journal of Elections, Public Opinion and Parties* 19 (4): 433–47. <https://doi.org/b9k9wc>
- Kenig, Ofer. 2009b. "Democratization of Party Leadership Selection: Do Wider Selectorates Produce More Competitive Contests?" *Electoral Studies* 28 (2): 240–47. <https://doi.org/cgcrmk>
- Kenig, Ofer, Gideon Rahat, and Reuven Y. Hazan. 2015. "Leadership Selection versus Candidate Selection: Similarities and Differences." In *Party Primaries in Comparative Perspective*. Routledge. <http://bit.ly/3IZqFwt>
- Kitschelt, Herbert. 1989. "The Internal Politics of Parties: The Law of Curvilinear Disparity Revisited." *Political Studies* 37 (3): 400–21. <https://doi.org/c2mdgq>
- Lehrer, Roni, and Nick Lin. 2020. "Everything to Everyone? Not When You Are Internally Divided." *Party Politics* 26 (6): 783–94. <https://doi.org/grjbnq>
- Leiras, Marcelo. 2007. *Todos los caballos del rey: la integración de los partidos políticos y el gobierno democrático de la Argentina, 1995–2003*. Buenos Aires: Prometeo Libros. <http://bit.ly/4nEy6bp>

- Leiras, Marcelo. 2010. "Los procesos de descentralización y la nacionalización de los sistemas de partidos en América Latina." *Política y gobierno* 17 (2): 205–41. <http://bit.ly/4h148ft>
- Lindberg, Staffan I., Nils Düpont, Maasaki Higashijima, Yaman Berker Kavasoglu, Kyle L. Marquardt, Michael Bernhard, Holger Döring, Allen Hicken, Melis Laebens, Juraj Medzihorsky, Anja Neundorf, Ora John Reuter, Saskia Ruth–Lovell, Keith R. Weghorst, Nina Wiesehomeier, Joseph Wright, Nazifa Alizada, Paul Bederke, Lisa Gastaldi, Sandra Grahm, Garry Hindle, Nina Ilchenko, Johannes von Römer, Steven Wilson, Daniel Pemstein, and Brigitte Seim. 2022. "Codebook Varieties of Party Identity and Organization (V–Party) V2." Database. Varieties of Democracy (V–Dem) Project. <https://doi.org/gtx3s5>
- Llanos, Beatriz, and Vivian Roza. 2018. "Más poder, menos mujeres: desigualdades de género en los partidos políticos latinoamericanos." In *Mujeres en la Política. Experiencias nacionales y subnacionales en América Latina*, 1st ed., edited by Flavia Freidenberg, Mariana Caminotti, Betilde Muñoz-Pogossian, and Tomáš Došek, 69–97. Mexico City: Instituto Electoral de la Ciudad de México; Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México. <http://bit.ly/3Wxhw1a>
- Loxbo, Karl. 2013. "The Fate of Intra-Party Democracy: Leadership Autonomy and Activist Influence in the Mass Party and the Cartel Party." *Party Politics* 19 (4): 537–54. <https://doi.org/bgg9bm>
- Martín Reyes, Javier. 2012a. "El tribunal de los militantes: El control judicial de los conflictos intrapartidistas en México." *América Latina Hoy* no. 62: 131–53. <https://doi.org/p8kr>
- Martín Reyes, Javier. 2012b. "De jueces, militantes y dirigencias partidistas: un panorama cuantitativo del control jurisdiccional de los conflictos intrapartidistas en México – 1996–2006 (Of Judges, Militants, and Bosses: A Quantitative Overview of the Judicial Review of Intraparty Disputes in Mexico – 1996–2006)." *Verdades* no. 25: 177–208. <https://bit.ly/4n2OEJi>
- Martínez Valdes, Gustavo. 2010. "Selección de candidatos del PAN a gobernadores entre 2000 y 2007: Coalición dominante y conflictos internos." Doctoral thesis, Mexico: FLACSO México. <http://bit.ly/470aerA>
- Melucci, Alberto. 1999. *Acción colectiva, vida cotidiana y democracia*. 1st ed. Mexico City: El Colegio de México. <https://doi.org/qcqx>
- Montero, Alfred P., and David J. Samuels, eds. 2004. *Decentralization and Democracy in Latin America*. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press.

- Okonkwo, Clement Nwafor, and Felix N. Unaji. 2016. "Intra-Party Conflict and Prospects of Democratic Consolidation in Nigeria." *IOSR Journal of Humanities and Social Science* 21 (5): 91–98. <http://bit.ly/48d1mRP>
- Panebianco, Angelo. 1995. *Modelos de partido: organización y poder en los partidos políticos*. Madrid: Alianza Editorial. <http://bit.ly/3Ww1lBj>
- Paz Pérez, Juan Enrique. 2006. "Los conflictos intrapartidistas: efectos de la competitividad electoral en la vida interna de los partidos políticos en México: 1988–2000." *Apuntes Electorales: Revista del Instituto Electoral del Estado de México* 5 (24): 9–161.
- Randall, Vicky, and Lars Svåsand. 2002. "Party Institutionalization in New Democracies." *Party Politics* 8 (1): 5–29. <https://doi.org/c4wfxv>
- Rose, Richard. 1964. "Parties, Factions and Tendencies in Britain." *Political Studies* 12 (1): 33–46. <https://doi.org/dmpg7r>
- Sartori, Giovanni. 2005. *Parties and Party Systems: A Framework for Analysis*. Colchester: European Consortium for Political Research Press.
- Schakel, Arjan H. 2013. "Congruence Between Regional and National Elections." *Comparative Political Studies* 46 (5): 631–62. <https://doi.org/c5x4km>
- Thorlakson, Lori. 2007. "An Institutional Explanation of Party System Congruence: Evidence from Six Federations." *European Journal of Political Research* 46 (1): 69–95. <https://doi.org/bqxmcs>
- Thorlakson, Lori. 2009. "Patterns of Party Integration, Influence and Autonomy in Seven Federations." *Party Politics* 15 (2): 157–77. <https://doi.org/bqxmcs>
- Trujillo, Henry. 2013. *Conflictos políticos y Poder Judicial (1985–2006): la judicialización de la política en Uruguay*. Montevideo: Ediciones Universitarias. <http://bit.ly/48WSaBc>
- Von dem Berge, Benjamin, Thomas Poguntke, Peter Obert, and Diana Tipei. 2013. *Measuring Intra-Party Democracy: A Guide for the Content Analysis of Party Statutes with Examples from Hungary, Slovakia and Romania*. SpringerBriefs in Political Science. Heidelberg: Springer. <http://bit.ly/4qfRBsP>
- Yadav, Vineeta, and Amanda Fidalgo. 2022. "The Face of the Party: Party Leadership Selection, and the Role of Family and Faith." *Political Research Quarterly* 75 (2): 379–93. <https://doi.org/gkc2fc>
- Zincone, Giovanna. 1972. "Accesso Autonomo Alle Risorse: Le Determinanti Del Frazionismo." *Italian Political Science Review / Rivista Italiana di Scienza Politica* 2 (1): 139–60.

Conflicts of interest:

The author declare no conflicts of interest.

Authors contribution:

CARLOS GUADARRAMA-CRUZ: conceptualization, investigation, methodology, writing (original draft), writing (review & editing).

Corresponding author:

CARLOS GUADARRAMA-CRUZ
<876216@pcpuma.acatlan.unam.mx>

LICENSE FOR USE AND DISTRIBUTION



This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (CC BY 4.0).

Authors are free to deposit versions of their manuscript in any repository of their choice (Sherpa/Romeo, Dulcinea, and Diadorim, among others). Both the submitted version of the article and the accepted and published version (registration version) may be deposited in repositories without incurring in penalties or embargoes.

[About the author]

CARLOS GUADARRAMA-CRUZ

Postdoctoral researcher affiliated with the Department of Higher Studies Acatlán of the Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México (UNAM). Doctor of Research in Social Sciences (mention in Political Science) from the Latin American Faculty of Social Sciences, Mexico headquarters. Member of the Sistema Nacional de Investigadoras e Investigadores (National System of Researchers). Research lines include political parties, elections, and electoral governance in Latin America.