1. Introduction
The heightened gender consciousness of recent decades has underscored the significance of having female representation in legislative bodies. Consequently, numerous countries, including Peru, have implemented affirmative actions such as gender quotas. These policies are designed to mitigate the structu-ral inequalities that impede women’s political participation and hinder parity with men (Larserud & Taphorn 2007, 8). However, quotas alone constitute an insufficient mechanism for guaranteeing a substantial increase in female parliamentary representation. A comprehensive analysis must, therefore, account for additional components of the electoral system, which interact with quotas to shape broader outcomes in women’s political inclusion.
The electoral system comprises the framework of rules governing the transla-tion of votes into legislative seats (Nohlen 2015). Its specific configuration can either facilitate or obstruct the election of women. A distinctive feature of the Peruvian electoral system is the preferential vote. This mechanism empowers voters to alter the pre-ordained sequence of candidates on a closed party list by casting a direct vote for one or more individual candidates, alongside selecting the party itself (Campos Ramos 2015; Soldevilla 2012).
While the gender quota has been the primary driver behind the rise of women in the Peruvian Congress, empirical evidence indicates that a signifi-cant number of female candidates also won seats through preferential votes in various elections (Campos Ramos 2015). This dynamic has created an ambiguous relationship between the preferential vote and the election of women in Peru.
In this regard, Schmidt (2020) demonstrates that prior to 2016, female legislative representation in Peru would have been higher in the absence of the preferential vote mechanism—that is, under a system where voters could not reorder pre-established party lists. Schmidt argues that while the preferen-tial vote had no statistically significant effect on the election of women in the electoral district Lima and residents abroad, it demonstrably reduced the number of women elected in other districts. The author attributes this differential impact to persistent cultural attitudes and socioeconomic contexts that continue to disadvantage women’s political participation outside the capital.
Despite the insights offered by Schmidt’s (2020) study, its analytical framework proves insufficient for explaining the outcomes of the 2020 Peruvian congressional elections. At first glance, the gender composition of parliament remained relatively stable: women constituted 26.15% of the legislature elected in 2020, compared to 26.92% in the 2016-2019 congres-sional term (Valles Vasquez 2025). However, comparing the results with and without the preferential vote reveal a critical shift in the 2020 election. Then, this mechanism played a decisive and positive role in securing seats for a greater number of female candidates. Therefore, this article seeks to identify the specific electoral and contextual elements that enabled the preferential vote to gain unprecedented relevance in augmenting women’s representation in the Peruvian Congress in 2020.
2. Theoretical framework: the preferential vote and the electoral system
The preferential vote is a variant of open-list proportional representation, granting voters the agency to alter the pre-established candidate order proposed by political parties (Nohlen 2015). Within the Peruvian system, this vote is double1 and optional. According to Nohlen (2015), there are two other types of parliamentary lists: (i) open lists, which allow voters to select candidates across different party lists; and (ii) closed and blocked lists, where the electorate votes only for a party list as a whole, with no capacity to alter its internal ranking.
Nevertheless, a significant body of literature employs the term “open-list systems” as a broad category encompassing various preferential vote mechanisms (Schmidt 2020; Valdini 2013; Jones et al. 2012). In line with this convention, this article will adopt the term “open list” specifically to closed-but-unblocked lists, and “closed list” to denote rigidly closed and blocked lists.
Scholars have also identified the negative aspects of preferential voting. These include the erosion of internal party discipline, increased electoral complexity for voters, a pronounced advantage for candidates with significant media exposure or personal resources, and a general escalation of campaign costs (Ayala Abril & Mas Castillo 2017; Tuesta Soldevilla 2012; Zovatto & Aguilar 2013). Conversely, proponents highlight its potential to enhance representative accountability by fostering a direct link between voters and individual candidates (Zovatto & Aguilar 2013). Additiona-lly, it provides a viable pathway to election for candidates placed in lower list positions—often women—although list position remains a powerful determi-nant of success (Ayala Abril & Mas Castillo 2017; Campos Ramos 2015; Tuesta Soldevilla 2012).
The Peruvian case demonstrates that while the preferential vote has facilitated the election of individual congresswomen, these isolated instances are insufficient to claim a systematic positive effect on aggregate female representation (Campos Ramos 2015). Valdini (2013) argues that even in countries where the electorate shows a willingness to vote for women, empirical evidence fails to demonstrate that preferential voting exerts a positive effect on women’s parliamentary presence. Consequently, the prevailing assessment is that, at best, its impact is neutral (Valdini 2013; Schmidt 2020).
For his part, Schmidt (2020, 157) applied a comparative analysis of the results of Peruvian congressional elections from 1978 under open and closed lists, which the author calls counterfactual comparisons. His findings indicate that since the gender quota’s introduction in 2000, a closed-list system would have elected significantly more women, particularly in districts outside the capital, Lima. His conclusion aligns with established theory positing that gender quotas achieve their greatest potential for increasing female representation in Parliament when applied to closed lists (Franceschet et al. 2012; Larserud & Taphorn 2007; Matland 2005). However, research on Latin America by Jones et al. (2012) qualifies this theory, concluding that when gender quota legislation contains critical design f laws, the differen-tial effect between closed and open lists on female representation loses statistical significance.
2.1. Gender quota without placement mandate
The gender quota in Peru is a legally mandated intervention, requiring political parties to include a minimum percentage of women on their candidate lists (Krook 2007, 367). Scholarly consensus holds that such quotas achieve optimal efficacy within electoral systems characterized by proportional representation, closed and blocked lists, and large district magnitudes (Archenti & Tula 2007; Matland 2005; Larserud & Taphorn 2007).
Implemented in 2000 at an initial rate of 25%, Peru’s gender quota precipi-tated a significant increase in female legislative representation, rising from 11% in 1995 to nearly 22% in the 2000 election (Villanueva Flores 2004, 61). This constituted one of the most substantial impacts observed in Latin America, a notable outcome given its application within an open-list system—a format generally considered unfavorable for female candidates (Schmidt2004a). The quota was later raised to 30%2 prior to the 2020 snap elections, yet it consistently lacked a crucial enforcement mechanism: a placement mandate. Extensive research underscores that such a mandate, which dictates the positioning of women on party lists, is essential for converting candidacy into election (Archenti & Tula 2007; Freidenberg & Lajas García 2015; Jones et al. 2012; Uchuypoma Soria & Freidenberg 2017; Jankowski & Marcinkiew icz 2017). Absent this provision, quotas primarily increase the number of female candidates rather than the number of female legislators elected (Jones & Navia 1999; Górecki & Kukolowicz 2014)
In the Peruvian context, the preferential vote has, in certain instances, functionally compensated for this design flaw by enabling some female candidates to overcome unfavorable list placements and secure election. Some authors attribute this effect to the double preferential vote, which incentivizes gender-equitable voting without disadvantaging male candidates (Gray 2017; Schmidt 2004b). Research by Gallo et al. (2008) indicates a persistent bias favoring candidates placed in higher list positions. Moreover, as the preferential vote is gender-neutral, it can also be leveraged by male candidates to improve their standing, thereby potentially displacing women and negating the quota’s intended effect on electoral outcomes.
As previously noted, Schmidt (2020) posits that the preferential vote primarily disadvantaged female candidates in electoral districts outside Lima and residents abroad, since it remains Peru’s sole large-magnitude district. Regarding this case, Archenti & Tula (2007) observe that this was the only district where the effective quota for elected women was met in both the 2001 and 2006 elections. This metric refers to the minimum number of women a party must include on its list for a given district, derived by rounding the decimal value resulting from the application of the statutory gender quota percentage (Archenti & Tula 2007, 198).
Regarding other districts, the authors indicate that even in 2006—when female representation reached a then-peak of 29%—no women were elected across nine of these low-magnitude districts (Archenti & Tula 2007, 199). This pattern suggests that district magnitude constitutes a critical variable in determining the ultimate effectiveness of gender quota legislation.
2.2. Electoral district size, party magnitude, and simultaneity of presidential and congressional elections
A critical element of the electoral system with significant implications for political representation is district magnitude, defined as the number of legislative seats allocated to a given electoral district. Districts are typically classified as either (i) single-member, awarding one seat; or (ii) multi-member, awarding more than one seat (Nohlen 2015, 23). While single-member districts operate solely on a majoritarian principle (Archenti & Tula 2007), multi-member districts are further categorized by their proportional effects: (i) small, with two to five seats; (ii) medium, with six to ten seats; and (iii) large, with more than ten seats (Nohlen 2015, 23-24). Various studies affirm that larger district magnitudes produce a more pronounced proportio-nal effect within an electoral system (Bunker & Navia 2010; Nohlen 2015; Tuesta Soldevilla 2002). Specifically, Archenti & Tula (2007, 189) argue that proportional effects become observable from a magnitude of six seats upward.
Consequently, a greater presence of elected female candidates is generally anticipated in medium and large districts.
District magnitude is intrinsically linked to the concept of party magnitude, which refers to the number of seats a specific party wins within a given district (Matland 2005, 101). Research suggests a positive correlation: as the number of seats a party wins in a district increases, so too does the proportion of those seats occupied by women, who are frequently placed in lower list positions (Larserud & Taphorn 2007; Matland 2005). Regarding open-list systems, Schmidt (2004a , 133) contends that while most literature on this relationship focuses on closed lists, large party magnitudes within open-list systems can also favor women’s election. This occurs because female candidates, even with comparatively fewer votes, may secure the final seats in parties that win numerous mandates. This observation is supported by Jones et al.(2012, 351-354) who conclude that the positive impact of party magnitude on women’s representation, in combination with open lists and gender quotas, becomes significant when party magnitude exceeds five seats—a condition met in medium and large districts.
Beyond district magnitude, other institutional design features influence party magnitudes, including the simultaneity of presidential and parliamen-tary elections (Jones et al. 2012). In presidential systems, where the executive and legislative branches are elected separately, these contests may be held concurrently or on different dates. Carey (1994, 306-310) notes that non-concurrent elections discourage the formation of electoral coalitions or alliances, often leading to greater party system fragmentation and reducing the likelihood of any single party securing a large seat share. Consequently, party magnitudes tend to be smaller, disproportionately affecting female candidates traditionally placed in lower list positions. This fragmentation proves particu-larly detrimental to women’s election in small—and even medium—districts, where their chances are already reduced. The issue of non-simultaneity holds particular relevance for this study, as the extraordinary congressional elections of 2020 were conducted separately from the presidential cycle, following the constitutional dissolution of the Peruvian Congress on September 30, 2019.
3. Methodology
Aligned with the methodological approach of Schmidt (2020), this research employs a counterfactual analysis. The first step involved distributing congres-sional seats according to a hypothetical closed-list format, thereby respecting the original candidate order predetermined by each party. This simulated outcome was then compared against the actual electoral results produced by the open-list system with preferential voting. This comparative procedure isolates and highlights the specific effect of the preferential vote, confirming its positive net impact on the election of women to the 2020-2021 Congress.
Building on this foundational analysis, the article conducts a comparative study of the 2011, 2016, and 2020 congressional elections. The objective is to identify which specific elements of the electoral system enabled the preferential vote to exert a positive influence on female representation in 2020, in contrast to its more neutral or negative effects in prior cycles. These three electoral cycles were selected based on their institutional comparability: each operated under an identical parliamentary design (130 seats allocated across 26 districts) and an identical gender quota rule (30% without a placement mandate). All election results and official party lists were sourced from the Oficina Nacional de Procesos Electorales – ONPE (National Office of Electoral Processes). For consistency, candidate lists were analyzed in their originally registered form, excluding subsequent modifications due to strikes, resignations, or exclusions.
This methodological framework is designed to test the following hypothesis:
H1. The reduction in average party magnitudes during the extraordinary 2020 congressional elections amplified the effect of candidate mobility within party lists. Consequently, the preferential vote, by enabling this mobility, became more visible and decisive for electoral outcomes, particu-larly for female candidates.
H2. The non-simultaneity of the 2020 snap congressional elections with a presidential election contributed to the fragmentation of partisan representation, thereby reducing party magnitudes relative to previous concurrent cycles.
In light of the initial findings, this article has expanded its analytical scope. Specifically, incorporating an analysis of the ordinal position of women on party lists was deemed essential to fully explain the electoral outcomes of the 2020 contest.
Furthermore, while inspired by Schmidt’s (2020) methodological framework, the analytical focus of this study is distinct, concentrating exclusi-vely on elements of electoral design to test the proposed hypotheses.
4. Congressional elections 2011, 2016, and 2020: a general review
This section provides a general review of the key elements of the Peruvian electoral system as they pertain to female representation across the 2011, 2016, and 2020 congressional elections
4.1. The preferential vote
Across the three electoral cycles under examination, Peru maintained a unicameral Congress elected via a double and optional preferential vote system. As illustrated in Figure 1, a significant proportion of female legislators in successive elections secured their seats through this mechanism. The data reveals a notable decline in this proportion during the 2016-2019 congressio-nal term, followed by a substantial recovery in the 2020-2021 term, when it reached its highest level since 2001. It is critical to note that Figure 1 exclusively accounts for women who would not have won a seat under a strict party-list order, as their initial list position exceeded their party’s magnitude. Percenta-ges from elections prior to 2011 are included to provide historical context for the mechanism’s impact.
Source: Own elaboration based on Campos Ramos (2015) and ONPE(2001; 2006; 2011; 2016; 2020)
Figure 1 Women legislators elected by preferential vote as a percentage of total women legislators
A more granular analysis employs a counterfactual comparison between simulated results under a closed-list system—absent the preferential vote—and the actual results produced by the open-list system. This method precisely identifies which electoral format yielded, or would have yielded, a greater number of female legislators. In this regard, Table 1 demonstrates that only in the snap elections of 2020 did the percentage of women elected under the open-list system surpass the percentage that would have been elected under a closed-list scenario. This finding indicates that in 2020, the preferential vote uniquely advantaged female candidates and served to increase the overall proportion of women in Congress.
Table 1 Counterfactual analysis of the percentage of women elected
| Year | Counterfactual result | Real result | Difference between counterfactual and real |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2001 | 20.8% | 18.3% | 2.5% |
| 2006 | 30.0% | 29.2% | 0.8% |
| 2011 | 26.2% | 21.5% | 4.7% |
| 2016 | 28.5% | 27.7% | 0.8% |
| 2020 | 20.8% | 26.2% | -5.4% |
Source: Own elaboration based on Schmidt (2020) and ONPE (2020).
4.2. Gender quota
Up to and including the 2020 elections, the mandated gender quota remained at 30%3 without a placement provision. Table 2 indicates that the majority of party lists that secured congressional representation in 2011, 2016, and 2020 were led by male candidates. However, the proportion of women positioned within the first half of party lists—a more competitive segment—presents a considerably more favorable picture (see Table 3).
Table 2 Lists headed by women
| Year | Total lists | Lists lead by women | Percentage |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2020 | 230 | 37 | 18.70 |
| 2016 | 153 | 40 | 26.14 |
| 2011 | 155 | 29 | 16.08 |
Source: Own elaboration based on ONPE (2011; 2016; 2020)
Table 3 Women positioned in the first half of party lists
| Year | Total women candidates | # women in the first half | Percentage |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2020 | 502 | 218 | 43.42 |
| 2016 | 324 | 127 | 39.20 |
| 2011 | 333 | 127 | 38.14 |
Source: Own elaboration based on ONPE (2011 ; 2016; 2020)
Notwithstanding this improvement, in electoral districts with low party magnitudes, the female candidates with the highest probability of securing a seat are those placed in the first list position. This advantage stems from the established tendency for leading candidates to accumulate a greater share of preferential votes (Gallo et al. 2008).
4.3. Electoral district size
Until 2020, Peru comprised 26 electoral districts: one for each department (with Metropolitan Lima also representing voters residing abroad), one for the Constitutional Province of Callao, and one for the remaining provinces of Lima. The resulting territorial distribution, categorized by district magnitude according to Nohlen’s (2015) typology, alongside the number of women legislators elected per district in each cycle, is detailed in Table 4.
Table 4 District magnitude and number of women legislators per district
| District type | Magnitude | District | Seats | Women electeds | ||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2011 | 2016 | 2020 | ||||
| Plurinominal | Big | Lima (residents abroad) | 36 | 12 | 12 | 13 |
| Medium | La Libertad | 7 | 0 | 2 | 2 | |
| Piura | 7 | 2 | 3 | 2 | ||
| Arequipa | 6 | 1 | 2 | 1 | ||
| Cajamarca | 6 | 1 | 0 | 2 | ||
| Small | Áncash | 5 | 1 | 3 | 2 | |
| Cusco | 5 | 2 | 1 | 1 | ||
| Junín | 5 | 1 | 1 | 0 | ||
| Lambayeque | 5 | 0 | 1 | 2 | ||
| Puno | 5 | 1 | 0 | 2 | ||
| Callao | 4 | 0 | 2 | 0 | ||
| Ica | 4 | 2 | 1 | 1 | ||
| Lima (provinces) | 4 | 1 | 2 | 1 | ||
| Loreto | 4 | 0 | 2 | 1 | ||
| San Martín | 4 | 1 | 1 | 1 | ||
| Ayacucho | 3 | 0 | 1 | 0 | ||
| Huánuco | 3 | 1 | 1 | 2 | ||
| Amazonas | 2 | 0 | 1 | 0 | ||
| Apurímac | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | ||
| Huancavelica | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | ||
| Moquegua | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | ||
| Pasco | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | ||
| Tacna | 2 | 1 | 0 | 0 | ||
| Tumbes | 2 | 1 | 0 | 0 | ||
| Ucayali | 2 | 0 | 0 | 1 | ||
| Uninominal | Madre de Dios | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | |
| Total | 130 | 28 | 36 | 34 | ||
Source: Own elaboration based on ONPE (2011; 2016; 2020)
Consistent with established theory, the largest district—Lima and residents abroad (hereafter, Lima)—elected the majority of female legislators in all three electoral cycles. Furthermore, female candidates elected from Lima combined with those from medium-magnitude districts consistently accounted for over half of all women in Congress, though the contribution from medium districts remained limited. Conversely, no women were elected from the single-member district, nor from four of the small (two-seat) districts. In several other small districts, only one or two women gained representation across the entire span of the three elections.
4.4. Party magnitude
While party magnitude is contingent upon both district size and electoral performance, a more proportional distribution of seats is systematically anticipated in larger districts. Reflecting this principle, every party that achieved representation in the 2011, 2016, and 2020 legislatures secured seats in the Lima district, albeit with varying magnitudes, as detailed in Table 5.
The scholarly consensus holds that larger party magnitudes typically correlate with the election of a greater number of women (Larserud & Taphorn 2007; Matland 2005; Schmidt 2004a). This pattern is evident in the 2011 and 2016 results but not in those of 2020. Notably, thirteen women were elected in Lima in 2020, one seat more than in the previous two cycles. This outcome may be attributed to the greater fragmentation of representation in 2020, wherein a larger number of parties gained seats with relatively similar—and modest—magnitudes, each consequently electing a comparable, limited number of women.
The 2016 results illustrate a contrasting dynamic. While the party with the largest magnitude elected a significantly high number of women, the district’s overall total was depressed by the performance of the second-largest party, which elected only one female legislator. In comparison, the 2011 election demonstrates a more consistently proportional relationship between a party’s magnitude and its number of female legislators.
Table 5 Party magnitude and women legislators in Lima
| Party | Magnitude | Women legislators |
|---|---|---|
| 2020 | ||
| Podemos Perú | 8 | 2 |
| Partido Morado | 6 | 2 |
| Acción Popular | 5 | 2 |
| Frepap | 5 | 2 |
| Fuerza Popular | 4 | 2 |
| Frente Amplio | 3 | 2 |
| Alianza para el Progreso | 2 | 1 |
| Somos Perú | 2 | 0 |
| Unión por el Perú | 1 | 0 |
| 2016 | ||
| Fuerza Popular | 15 | 8 |
| Peruanos por el Kambio | 10 | 1 |
| Frente Amplio | 3 | 2 |
| Alianza Popular | 3 | 1 |
| Acción Popular | 3 | 0 |
| Alianza para el Progreso | 2 | 0 |
| 2011 | ||
| Fuerza 2011 | 10 | 4 |
| Alianza para el Gran Cambio | 7 | 3 |
| Gana Perú | 7 | 2 |
| Perú Posible | 6 | 1 |
| Solidaridad Nacional | 4 | 1 |
| Apra | 2 | 1 |
Fuente: Own elaboration based on ONPE (2011; 2016; 2020)
4.5. Elector al (non-)simultaneity
Under standard conditions, Peruvian parliamentary elections are held concurrently with the first round of the presidential election. This simultaneity was disrupted for the 2020 snap elections following the constitutional dissolution of Congress. On September 30, 2019, President Martín Vizcarra dissolved the legislature after a second successful vote of no confidence against the president of the Council of Ministers during the 2016-2021 term. In accordance with constitutional provisions, parliamentary elections were subsequently called for January 26, 2020, to elect a new Congress to complete the term of the dissolved body. Consequently, 2020 marked the first instance in which presidential and parliamentary elections were non-simultaneous as a direct result of a constitutional dissolution.
Table 6 Results of presidential and congressional elections
| Party | Presidential candidate | % presidential vote | % Congress vote | No. seats | No. women |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2020 | |||||
| Acción Popular | - | - | 10.26 | 25 | 4 |
| Alianza para el Progreso | - | - | 7.96 | 22 | 5 |
| Fuerza Popular | - | - | 7.31 | 15 | 6 |
| Frepap | - | - | 8.38 | 15 | 5 |
| Unión por el Perú | - | - | 6.77 | 13 | 2 |
| Podemos Perú | - | - | 8.38 | 11 | 3 |
| Somos Perú | - | - | 6.05 | 11 | 3 |
| Partido Morado | - | - | 7.40 | 9 | 3 |
| Frente Amplio | - | - | 6.16 | 9 | 3 |
| 2016 | |||||
| Fuerza Popular | Keiko Fujimori | 39.86 | 36.34 | 73 | 26 |
| Peruanos por el Kambio | Pedro Pablo Kuckzynski | 21.50 | 16.46 | 20 | 4 |
| Frente Amplio | Verónika Mendoza | 18.74 | 13.94 | 18 | 3 |
| Alianza para el Progreso | - | - | 9.23 | 9 | 2 |
| Alianza Popular | Alan García | 5.83 | 8.31 | 5 | 1 |
| Acción Popular | Alfredo Barnechea | 6.97 | 7.20 | 5 | 0 |
| 2011 | |||||
| Gana Perú | Ollanta Humala | 31.69 | 25.27 | 47 | 12 |
| Fuerza 2011 | Keiko Fujimori | 25.55 | 22.97 | 37 | 9 |
| Perú Posible | Alejandro Toledo | 15.63 | 14.83 | 21 | 2 |
| Alianza para el Gran Cambio | Pedro Pablo Kuckzynski | 18.51 | 14.42 | 12 | 3 |
| Solidaridad Nacional | Luis Castañeda | 9.83 | 10.22 | 9 | 1 |
| Apra | - | - | 6.43 | 4 | 1 |
Fuente: Own elaboration based on ONPE (2011; 2016; 2020)
The alteration of the electoral cycle in 2020 resulted in greater dispersion of the vote share among parties compared to previous concurrent elections. As demonstrated in Table 6, the percentage of valid votes for parliamentary lists typically correlates with the performance of their respective presidential candidates—a pattern evident in 2011 and 2016. This linkage was absent in 2020 due to the absence of a concurrent presidential race, leading to a more uniform distribution of party votes. For instance, the gap between the most- and least-voted parties was a mere four percentage points in 2020. This contrasts sharply with the disparities observed in 2011 (approximately 18 percentage points) and 2016 (29 percentage points). Consequently, the 2020-2021 Congress was characterized by a larger number of represented parties with a relatively equitable seat distribution, precluding a single-party majority. This fragmentation also resulted in a more uniform distribution of female legislators across the represented parties.
5. The effect of the preferential vote on the election of women: counterfactual analysis
Building on the data presented in Table 1, Table 7 provides a detailed numerical account of the counterfactual analysis for the elections under study. The analysis indicates that the difference between the counterfactual and actual results in 2016 was minimal, with only one additional female candidate projected to win a seat under a closed-list system. In contrast, the 2011 and 2020 elections would have produced substantially different outcomes, albeit in opposing directions: a closed-list system would have yielded six more women legislators in 2011, whereas seven women elected in 2020 owed their seats directly to the preferential vote.
Table 7 Numerical counterfactual analysis of the election of women
| Year | Counterfactual result | Real result | Difference between counterfactual and real |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2011 | 34 | 28 | +6 |
| 2016 | 37 | 36 | +1 |
| 2020 | 27 | 34 | -7 |
If these results are divided between Lima and the other districts (see Table 8), it is revealed that the preferential vote was always favorable to the election of more women legislators in Lima, although its impact was practically neutral in 2016 and 2020. In contrast, in the other districts, the preferential vote only benefited the election of more women in 2020. In 2011 and 2016, the closed list would have allowed for the election of a greater number of women legislators in medium and small districts.
A disaggregation of these results between the Lima district and all other districts (see Table 8) reveals a distinct pattern. The preferential vote consistently produced a net benefit for women’s election in Lima, though its impact was marginal in 2016 and 2020. In contrast, the mechanism proved detrimental to women’s representation in other districts during the 2011 and 2016 cycles, where a closed-list system would have elected more women. The 2020 election marks a significant departure, as the preferential vote yielded a positive net effect on female representation in medium and small districts.
Table 8 Numerical counterfactual analysis of the election of women: Lima vs. other districts
| Year | Lima real | Lima counterfactual | Difference between counterfactual and real |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2011 | 12 | 9 | +3 |
| 2016 | 12 | 11 | +1 |
| 2020 | 13 | 12 | +1 |
| Year | Other districts real | Other districts counterfactual | Difference between counterfactual and real |
| 2011 | 16 | 25 | -9 |
| 2016 | 24 | 26 | -2 |
| 2020 | 21 | 15 | +6 |
Fuente: Own elaboration based on ONPE (2011; 2016; 2020)
This finding engages directly with Schmidt’s (2020) conclusion regarding the preferential vote’s historically ambiguous effect in Lima, meaning that any marginal result for this district remains consistent with prior expectations. However, Schmidt (2020) also established that in all elections from 2001 to 2016, the preferential vote mechanism negatively impacted the number of women elected in districts outside Lima. The 2020 counterfactual result, therefore, presents a critical anomaly, prompting the central research question: what changed in the medium and small districts to enable the preferential vote to favor the election of more women in 2020?
Given its large seat allocation, the Lima district concentrates the highestabsolute number of candidates who benefit from the preferential vote. However, as this mechanism is gender-neutral, its aggregate effect on female representation is not inherently positive. Tables 9 and 10 delineate the various candidate-level movements generated by the preferential vote within party lists. Movements 1 and 2 represent shifts that do not alter the final number of women elected. Movement 4 is the most detrimental outcome for female representation, as it results in a male candidate displacing a woman from a seat. Conversely, Movement 3 is the most favorable, wherein a woman secures a seat at the expense of a male candidate.
Table 9 List movements generated by preferential vote in Lima
| Movement | 2011 | 2016 | 2020 |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1. Male candidate displaces another male candidate | 7 | 8 | 7 |
| 2. Female candidate displaces another female candidate | 3 | 1 | 1 |
| 3. Female candidate displaces a male candidate | 4 | 2 | 2 |
| 4. Male candidate displaces a female candidate | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Total benefited | 15 | 12 | 11 |
Fuente: Own elaboration based on ONPE (2011; 2016; 2020)
As shown in Table 9, the primary effect of the preferential vote in Lima is to reshuffle the order of male candidates. In each election year, only one instance occurred of a man displacing a woman from a seat. While a notable number of women improved their list position and were elected, nearly half of them did so by replacing another woman, resulting in no net gain for aggregate female representation. The overall distribution of list movements in 2016 and 2020 is nearly identical, indicating a stable pattern in the mechanism’s operation within the capital district across the three electoral cycles.
Table 10 List movements generated by the preferential vote in other districts
| Movement | 2011 | 2016 | 2020 |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1. Male candidate displaces another male candidate | 12 | 4 | 14 |
| 2. Female candidate displaces another female candidate | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| 3. Female candidate displaces a male candidate | 4 | 3 | 12 |
| 4. Male candidate displaces a female candidate | 13 | 5 | 6 |
| Total benefited | 30 | 13 | 33 |
Fuente: Own elaboration based on ONPE (2011; 2016; 2020)
In contrast, Table 10 reveals more varied and consequential dynamics in districts outside Lima. In 2016, only thirteen candidates benefited from the preferential vote, less than half compared to the other elections. Furthermore, while the total number of beneficiaries in 2011 and 2020 appears similar, a breakdown of the movements reveals critical divergences. First, the number of women who gained seats by displacing male candidates in 2020 tripled the figure from 2011 and quadrupled that from 2016. Second, the incidence of men displacing women in 2011 was more than double the rate observed in 2016 and 2020; this negative effect was substantial enough to offset the gains made by women via the preferential vote in Lima that year.
Consequently, the net effect of the preferential vote in medium and small districts emerges as the decisive factor determining the overall number of women who ultimately gain access to Congress.
6. Reduced party magnitudes in 2020
The 2020 electoral cycle, triggered by the constitutional dissolution of Congress, yielded a directly fragmented legislature. While fragmentation is often theorized to enhance electoral proportionality (Bunker & Navia 2010; Espí Hernández 2017), the realization of this effect is conditional on district magnitude. As noted, Archenti & Tula (2007) argue that meaningful proportionality becomes observable only in districts with six or more seats—that is, in medium and large districts. Given that the majority of Peruvian districts are small, a broadly proportional allocation of seats among parties across the national territory is structurally unattainable.
The 2016 elections exemplify the disproportionality inherent in small-magnitude districts. In that year, the party Fuerza Popular secured 56% of congressional seats with only 36% of the national vote. This outcome was partly driven by its performance in two-seat districts, where it won all seats in four of the eight such districts and one seat in each of the remaining four, capturing twelve of sixteen total seats from these jurisdictions.
Peru contains only four medium districts (two with six seats, two with seven). Although these districts facilitate greater proportionality than smallones, party magnitudes remain inherently constrained by the limited seat pool. Due to its exceptional size, Lima stands as the sole district where party magnitudes can proportionally reflect a party’s vote share.
A key feature of the 2016 and, to a lesser degree, the 2011 elections was the dominance of a single party, Fuerza Popular, which concentrated seats and thereby limited the magnitudes of competing parties across most districts. In 2011, while Gana Perú won at least one seat in nearly every district, it held a substantially larger magnitude than rivals only in Cusco and Tacna (Valles Vasquez 2025).
In stark contrast, the 2020 elections produced extremely small party magnitudes across medium and small districts, typically limited to one or two seats per party, with the sole exception of Fuerza Popular’s three-seat win in Piura (Valles Vasquez 2025). In Lima, party magnitudes were also significantly reduced relative to prior cycles due to the proliferation of represented parties.
For women’s election, this shift is critical. Jones et al. (2012) establish that under open-list systems, the election of more women legislators is strongly associated with party magnitudes of five or more seats—a threshold regularly met only in Lima, as shown in Table 5. However, the 2020 fragmentation imposed a new constraint: irrespective of their national vote share, most parties secured seats for only two female legislators each, while the smallest caucuses elected either one woman (Alianza para el Progreso) or none (Uniónpor el Perú and Somos Perú) (Valles Vasquez 2025).
Indeed, a party with a commanding vote share can exceptionally achieve a magnitude of five or more seats even in medium or small districts. This scenario materialized only twice in the elections under review: in 2011, when Gana Perú secured all five seats in Cusco, and in 2016, when Fuerza Popular won five of seven seats in Piura (Valles Vasquez 2025). In both instances, these districts recorded their highest number of elected women across the three cycles. In all other districts, female representation remained between zero and two legislators, with the singular exception of Áncash in 2016, where women occupied three of five seats—two from Fuerza Popular and one from Frente Amplio (Valles Vasquez 2025).
The Áncash 2016 case elucidates the complex interplay of list dynamics. Fuerza Popular won three seats, Frente Amplio one, and APP one. While Fuerza Popular and Frente Amplio elected women, APP’s sole seat went to a man (Valles Vasquez 2025). A counterfactual closed-list scenario reveals that this seat would have gone to a female APP candidate. Furthermore, although Fuerza Popular’s seat allocation was unchanged by the preferential vote, the internal candidate order was altered: the two elected women held the top two list positions, while a male candidate in third place received the most preferential votes. Crucially, the party’s magnitude of three seats protected the top-ranked women from displacement. Conversely, in APP, the male candidate in list position two overtook the female candidate in position one via preferential votes; with a party magnitude of only one seat, this resulted in the woman's exclusion.
Thus, the effects of the preferential vote—whether detrimental or beneficial to female candidates—can be partially or wholly neutralized within parties possessing sufficiently large magnitudes, even in lower-magnitude districts.
7. Preferential vote obscured by party magnitude
Lima’s large seat pool renders the mechanical effects of the preferential vote most visible and generates the greatest intra-list mobility. Across the three elections, only two lists—Frente Amplio in 2016 (three seats) and APP in 2020 (two seats)—entered Congress in their original party order. In all other cases, the preferential vote altered list sequences, though its ultimate impact on seat allocation was often muted by party magnitude.
The 2020 case of Partido Morado in Lima serves as a prime illustration. The party won six seats, ultimately filled by candidates in the following order of list number: (6) Alberto de Belaunde, (7) Gino Costa, (1) Francisco Sagasti, (20) Daniel Olivares, (5) Zenaida Solís, and (2) Carolina Lizárraga. Under a closedlist system, candidates (7) and (20) would have lost their seats, while candidates (3) and (4) would have been elected (Valles Vasquez 2025). Notably, the two female victors, including Congresswoman Carolina Lizárraga (list number 2), secured the last seats won by the party. Lizárraga, despite her high list placement, was overtaken by several lower-ranked (predominantly male) candidates through preferential votes but was ultimately protected by the party’s magnitude of six. A smaller magnitude would have resulted in her exclusion. This pattern—where women are demoted in the final tally but still elected due to ample party magnitude—occurred for six other female candidates in Lima across the three electoral cycles.
Furthermore, seven instances are identified where female legislators ascended the party list due to preferential votes; however, this positive effect remains obscured by party magnitude. For instance, the Frepap party secured five seats in Lima in 2020, with candidates ultimately elected in the following order of their original list numbers: (3) Wilmer Cayllahua, (4) María Retamozo, (7) Isaías Pineda, (10) Richard Rubio, and (6) María Teresa Céspedes. Candidate María Retamozo (list number 4), advanced her position to be elected second (Valles Vasquez 2025). Because Frepap’s magnitude of five seats was sufficient to include her original list position, Retamozo would have been elected even under a closed-list system, rendering the beneficial impact of the preferential vote invisible. Conversely, had Frepap won only two or three seats, Congresswoman Retamozo would be clearly classified as a direct beneficiary of the mechanism.
Table 11 Congressmembers elected by preferential vote (PV) by district
| District | Seats | Congressmembers elected by PV | ||
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2011 | 2016 | 2020 | ||
| Lima (residents abroad) | 36 | 15 | 12 | 11 |
| La Libertad | 7 | 2 | 1 | 3 |
| Piura | 7 | 1 | - | 2 |
| Arequipa | 6 | 2 | 1 | 2 |
| Cajamarca | 6 | 1 | 1 | 2 |
| Áncash | 5 | 2 | 1 | 2 |
| Cusco | 5 | - | 1 | 3 |
| Junín | 5 | 1 | 2 | 1 |
| Lambayeque | 5 | - | - | 2 |
| Puno | 5 | 3 | 1 | 2 |
| Callao | 4 | 1 | - | - |
| Ica | 4 | 1 | - | 1 |
| Lima (provinces) | 4 | 2 | - | 2 |
| Loreto | 4 | 1 | - | 2 |
| San Martín | 4 | - | - | 1 |
| Ayacucho | 3 | - | 1 | 1 |
| Huánuco | 3 | 3 | - | 1 |
| Amazonas | 2 | 1 | - | - |
| Apurímac | 2 | 1 | 1 | - |
| Huancavelica | 2 | - | - | 1 |
| Moquegua | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 |
| Pasco | 2 | 2 | - | 1 |
| Tacna | 2 | 1 | - | - |
| Tumbes | 2 | 1 | - | - |
| Ucayali | 2 | 2 | - | 1 |
| Madre de Dios | 1 | - | 1 | 1 |
| 45 | 25 | 44 | ||
Fuente: Own elaboration based on ONPE (2011; 2016; 2020)
Table 11 indicates that in 2016, no candidate was elected solely by the preferential vote in thirteen small districts and one medium district. This was primarily a consequence of Fuerza Popular’s dominance, which captured between 50% and 100% of seats in those districts. It is important to note that the preferential vote still generated intra-list mobility. For example, in the Amazonas, Ucayali, and Tumbes districts—where Fuerza Popular won all available seats—the candidate in list position 2 surpassed the candidate in position 1 in preferential votes. Yet, the party’s magnitude ensured that both the displaced and the displacing candidates were elected, neutralizing the mechanism’s visible effect on seat allocation.
These observations affirm that larger party magnitudes, relative to district size, increase the likelihood that the preferential vote’s effect will be obscured. In some cases, magnitude can protect a female candidate who is demoted on the list, as occurred with Fuerza Popular candidates in the Áncash, Huánuco,and San Martín districts in 2016, and with three other women in 2011. This protective effect, however, did not materialize in the 2020 extraordinary elections, where no woman who fell back in the final vote tally in a medium or small district was elected. The principal explanation lies in the substantially reduced party magnitudes in those districts in 2020.
Table 12 Party Magnitudes in small and medium districts
| Magnitude | 2020 | 2016 | 2011 |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 seat | 73 | 31 | 48 |
| 2 seats | 9 | 11 | 13 |
| 3 seats | 1 | 8 | 5 |
| 4 seats | - | 3 | - |
| 5 seats | - | 1 | 1 |
Fuente: Own elaboration based on ONPE (2011; 2016; 2020)
As shown in Table 12, the 2020 elections produced 73 instances of a party winning only a single seat in small and medium districts—a figure substantially higher than in 2016 or 2011. Furthermore, the maximum magnitude achieved in these districts in 2020 was a single case of three seats. This contraction in party magnitudes rendered the effects of the preferential vote far more acute and visible than in prior cycles. Specifically, any movement of a female candidate on the list—whether upward or downward—became more likely to directly determine her election or defeat, making her identifiable as a clear beneficiary or victim of the mechanism. Consequently, with the sole exception of the UPP list in Puno, every woman who advanced her position and was elected in 2020 can be classified as a direct beneficiary of the preferential vote.
8. Women elected by preferential vote
Building on the preceding analysis, Table 13 details the number of women who were direct beneficiaries of the preferential vote in each electoral district.
Table 13 Women elected by preferential vote by electoral district
| District | Seats | 2011 | 2016 | 2020 | |||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Women | PV | Women | PV | Women | PV | ||
| Lima (residents abroad) | 36 | 12 | 7 | 12 | 3 | 13 | 3 |
| La Libertad | 7 | 0 | - | 2 | 1 | 2 | 1 |
| Piura | 7 | 2 | - | 3 | - | 2 | 1 |
| Arequipa | 6 | 1 | - | 2 | - | 1 | - |
| Cajamarca | 6 | 1 | - | 0 | - | 2 | 2 |
| Áncash | 5 | 1 | 1 | 3 | - | 2 | 1 |
| Cusco | 5 | 2 | - | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Junín | 5 | 1 | - | 1 | 1 | 0 | - |
| Lambayeque | 5 | 0 | - | 1 | - | 2 | 1 |
| Puno | 5 | 1 | - | 0 | - | 2 | 1 |
| Callao | 4 | 0 | - | 2 | - | 0 | - |
| Ica | 4 | 2 | 1 | 1 | - | 1 | 1 |
| Lima (provinces) | 4 | 1 | 1 | 2 | - | 1 | 1 |
| Loreto | 4 | 0 | - | 2 | - | 1 | 1 |
| San Martín | 4 | 1 | - | 1 | - | 1 | - |
| Ayacucho | 3 | 0 | - | 1 | 1 | 0 | - |
| Huánuco | 3 | 1 | 1 | 1 | - | 2 | 1 |
| Amazonas | 2 | 0 | - | 1 | - | 0 | - |
| Apurímac | 2 | 0 | - | 0 | - | 0 | - |
| Huancavelica | 2 | 0 | - | 0 | - | 0 | - |
| Moquegua | 2 | 0 | - | 0 | - | 0 | - |
| Pasco | 2 | 0 | - | 0 | - | 0 | - |
| Tacna | 2 | 1 | 1 | 0 | - | 0 | - |
| Tumbes | 2 | 1 | - | 0 | - | 0 | - |
| Ucayali | 2 | 0 | - | 0 | - | 1 | 1 |
| Madre de Dios | 1 | 0 | - | 0 | - | 0 | - |
| Total | 130 | 28 | 12 | 36 | 7 | 34 | 16 |
Fuente: Own elaboration based on ONPE (2011; 2016; 2020)
In medium and small districts, the data show that typically only one woman per district is elected via this mechanism, with the 2020 case of Cajamarca (two women) being the exception. Notably, the 2020 elections saw more women elected by preferential vote in these districts than in previous cycles. In six such districts, the women elected by preferential vote constituted the entire female delegation. In others, they accounted for half of the district’s female legislators. While the extremely small party magnitudes in 2020 made the effect of the preferential vote more discernible, this factor alone is insufficient to explain the marked increase in female beneficiaries of the mechanism.
9. Candidate list position and the preferential vote
As established, list position is a critical determinant of a candidate’s ability to attract preferential votes (Tuesta Soldevilla 2012). Therefore, an analysis of the original list numbers of winning candidates in medium and small districts is essential (Table 14). As anticipated, candidates occupying the first list position secured the majority of the 94 seats allocated to these districts. However, only in 2020 did more than half of these seats go to list leaders. This outcome is attributable to the reduced party magnitudes in 2020, which enabled a greater number of parties to win seats. Consequently, the number-one candidates from more parties gained an opportunity for election, provided they were not displaced by competitors from within their own list via preferential votes.
Table 14 List numbers of elected candidates in medium and small districts
| List number | 2020 | 2016 | 2011 | |||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Elected | Women | Elected | Women | Elected | Women | |
| 1 | 54 | 6 | 45 | 9 | 43 | 7 |
| 2 | 26 | 11 | 24 | 4 | 28 | 3 |
| 3 | 8 | 1 | 16 | 6 | 15 | 4 |
| 4 | 4 | 1 | 6 | 2 | 4 | 2 |
| 5 | 1 | - | 3 | 3 | 1 | - |
| 6 | 1 | - | - | - | 2 | - |
| 7 | - | - | - | - | 1 | - |
| Seats | 94 | 19 | 94 | 24 | 94 | 16 |
Fuente: Own elaboration based on ONPE (2011; 2016; 2020)
The district of Junín illustrates this dynamic. In 2020, five parties secured representation in this five-seat district, with four of the seats won by each party’s list leader. By contrast, only three parties won seats in Junín in 2011 and 2016. In 2011, all three list leaders were elected, while in 2016, only one list leader succeeded.
Despite the proliferation of list leaders winning seats in 2020, the number of women elected from the first list position was the lowest of the three elections, whereas 2016 recorded the highest number of female list leaders elected. This finding correlates with the data in Table 2, which shows that more women headed party lists in 2016. Conversely, the context of smaller party magnitudes in 2020 would ostensibly disadvantage candidates in lower list positions. Yet, Table 14 reveals a counterintuitive result: a significantly higher number of women were elected from the second list position in 2020.
Disaggregating the list positions of women elected by preferential vote in these districts (Table 15) clarifies this pattern. In 2020, the majority of such women originally held the second list position. In contrast, no woman was elected by preferential vote from the second position in either 2011 or 2016. This shift is directly linked to the diminished party magnitudes of 2020, which amplified the visibility and success of upward mobility for candidates in the second slot. These data reinforce the established principle that list placement remains electorally significant even under open-list systems (Ayala Abril & Mas Castillo 2016; Jankowski & Marcinkiewicz 2017; Tuesta Soldevilla 2012). Thus, while the total number of candidates elected from the second position was similar across elections, the decisive factor in 2020 was the increased number of women occupying that competitive position.
Table 15 List number of women elected by preferential vote in medium and small districts
| Number | 2020 | 2016 | 2011 |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | 10 | - | - |
| 3 | 1 | 1 | 4 |
| 4 | 2 | 1 | 1 |
| 5 | - | 2 | - |
| Total | 13 | 4 | 5 |
Fuente: Own elaboration based on ONPE (2011; 2016; 2020)
When reviewing the universe of candidates (Table 16), it is observed that almost 45% of those who ran with number two in 2020 were women, a figure considerably higher than in 2011 and 2016. It is worth noting that the number two position on a party list is especially important in small districts, where between three and five candidates run.
Table 16 Women with Number 2 on party lists
| Year | # 2 Candidates | # 2 Women | Percentage |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2020 | 230 | 102 | 44.40 |
| 2016 | 156 | 43 | 27.60 |
| 2011 | 155 | 50 | 32.30 |
Fuente: Own elaboration based on ONPE (2011; 2016; 2020)
10. Findings
This study demonstrates that within an open-list system, substantial party magnitudes can partially or entirely obscure the effect of the preferential vote on female candidates, whether beneficial or detrimental, as evidenced in the 2016 elections. This obfuscating effect is most recurrent in the Lima district, where the high number of available seats enables multiple parties to achieve significant magnitudes. While Lima consequently accounts for the largest absolute number of legislators elected via preferential vote, the analysis confirms that the net impact of this mechanism on female representation varies significantly across electoral cycles, driven primarily by dynamics within medium and small districts.
The research further establishes that a key alteration to the electoral design in 2020—namely, the non-simultaneity of presidential and congressional elections—precipitated a significant reduction in party magnitudes across the board. In medium and small districts, these diminished magnitudes rendered the seat-determining effects of the preferential vote more acute and visible. Although the total number of candidates elected by preferential vote in these districts was similar in 2011 and 2020, the gender outcome differed markedly: thirteen women were elected via this mechanism in 2020, compared to only five in 2011. Party magnitude alone could not account for this disparity, prompting an analysis of candidate list placement.
The investigation revealed that while a similar proportion of women headed party lists in both elections, a significantly larger share of female candidates occupied the second list position in 2020. Specifically, 44.40% of female candidates ran in the second position in 2020, compared to 32.30% in 2011. This strategic placement of women in a competitively viable list position—the second slot—emerged as the critical factor which, when combined with reduced party magnitudes, enabled the preferential vote to exert a net positive impact on women's election to the 2020-2021 Congress.
11. Conclusions
This article reaffirms the critical importance of candidate list placement for female electoral prospects, even within open-list systems. It further demonstrates that the reduction in party magnitudes—a direct consequence of the non-simultaneous 2020 congressional elections—amplified the visible impact of the preferential vote on electoral outcomes. However, this study does not posit that the preferential vote inherently increases female representation. Rather, it illustrates that the mechanism operated exceptionally in favor of women only under the unique and unlikely-to-recur circumstances of the 2020 elections.
In contrast to Schmidt’s (2020) work, which incorporates cultural explanations, this research has deliberately focused on institutional and electoral design factors to account for the differential effects of the preferential vote between Lima and other districts. A fruitful avenue for future research would be an investigation into the strategic party-level decisions that led to a higher proportion of women being placed in the second list position in 2020, a key factor identified in this analysis.
It must be noted that the Peruvian electoral framework is poised for significant transformation with the return to bicameralism in 2026. Concurrently, the preferential vote—though in a modified format—has been reinstated after its scheduled abolition was reversed. The findings of this article suggest that the decision to retain the preferential vote will have tangible implications for the implementation of gender parity and alternation rules, which are also mandated to take effect from 2026.
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Notes:
1 The preferential vote format in Peru has changed since the 2026 general elections.
2 Perú. Ley n. ° 26859, Ley Orgánica de Elecciones, título V, capítulo 4, artículo 116. October 1, 1997. https://bit.ly/4mYTc3f
3 Perú. Ley n. ° 26859, Ley Orgánica de Elecciones, título V, capítulo 4, artículo 116.